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Abstract
We develop the institutional configuration perspective to understand which
national contexts facilitate social entrepreneurship (SE). We confirm joint effects
on SE of formal regulatory (government activism), informal cognitive (post-
materialist cultural values), and informal normative (socially supportive cultural
norms, or weak-tie social capital) institutions in a multilevel study of 106,484
individuals in 26 nations. We test opposing propositions from the institutional
void and institutional support perspectives. Our results underscore the impor-
tance of resource support from both formal and informal institutions, and
highlight motivational supply side influences on SE. They advocate greater
consideration of institutional configurations in institutional theory and compara-
tive entrepreneurship research.
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INTRODUCTION
Public and private initiatives increasingly recognize social entrepre-
neurship (SE) as a means of addressing a wide range of social needs
(The Economist, 2010). The US-based Skoll Foundation has invested
more than US$ 358 million in social entrepreneurs worldwide (Skoll
Foundation, 2013). Public initiatives to encourage private-sector SE
include the UK government’s “Big Society”1 and the European
Commission’s “Social Business Initiative” (European Commission,
2013). An extensive review of SE research (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin,
2009) suggests a dramatic rise in academic interest in the past two
decades. However, SE research lags behind practice (Nicholls, 2010).
While the prominence of SE varies substantially across countries
(Lepoutre, Justo, Terjesen, & Bosma, 2013), we know little about
factors that may drive national differences. The purpose of our study
is to understand which national contexts may facilitate SE.
We build on institutional theory (North, 2005; Scott, 1995) and
enhance it with the institutional conﬁguration perspective to iden-
tify nation-level antecedents of individuals’ engagement in SE.
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So far, SE research has mainly discussed the role of
formal institutions in SE (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear,
2010; Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2013a;
Mair & Marti, 2009; Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, &
Shulman, 2009). As used here, the institutional con-
ﬁguration perspective recognizes that human beha-
vior is shaped jointly by the constraints, incentives,
and resources provided by formal and informal
institutions, which can be more or less compatible
with each other. This proposition has often been
discussed in extant research (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li,
2010; Scott, 2005; Whitley, 1994) but has rarely
been empirically tested. We develop a multilevel
model for nation-level institutional inﬂuences on
individual SE that proposes both main and interac-
tive (synergistic and substitutive) effects of formal
and informal institutions. Our ﬁndings support the
institutional conﬁguration perspective, advancing
our understanding of the national drivers of SE and
research on institutional theory in International
Business (IB) more generally.
This investigation of institutional conﬁgurations
also allows us to resolve conﬂicting perspectives on
the role of formal, regulatory institutions. According
to the institutional void perspective (Dacin et al.,
2010; Estrin et al., 2013a), SE motivation increases
in resource-scarce environments in which social
problems are abundant. Less active governments, in
particular, may trigger higher social need, and thus
greater demand for SE (Dacin et al., 2010; Zahra
et al., 2009). A countervailing perspective, which we
henceforth refer to as institutional support, is that
countries with more active governments will sup-
port and thus enhance SE (Evans, 1996; Korosec &
Berman, 2006; Zahra & Wright, 2011). We resolve
these apparent inconsistencies by considering that
institutions may inﬂuence individual behavior, both
as stimulants of motivation and as providers of
tangible and intangible resource support to social
entrepreneurs. More broadly, our study follows
recent calls for greater consideration of the impact
of context on entrepreneurial behavior (Welter,
2011; Zahra & Wright, 2011), and for the advance-
ment of SE research through quantitative methods
(Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011; Short et al., 2009).
SE AS A FIELD OF INQUIRY
A social entrepreneur is an individual working for
his or her own account while primarily pursuing
pro-social goals, that is, goals set to beneﬁt people
other than the entrepreneur (Bierhoff, 2002). The
ﬁrst part of this deﬁnition – working for one’s
own account – draws upon the occupational
deﬁnition of entrepreneurship (Hébert & Link,
1982). This deﬁnition is not restrictive with regard
to the types of goals that entrepreneurs pursue,
that is, to generate social vs economic wealth.
Thus we can apply the deﬁnition to both commer-
cial and social entrepreneurs. The emphasis on pro-
social goals and social wealth creation over eco-
nomic wealth creation differentiates social from
commercial entrepreneurs and is consistent with
recent SE deﬁnitions (Mair & Marti, 2006; Zahra
et al., 2009).
By applying institutional theory to SE, we can
develop new insights for both (social) entrepreneur-
ship and institutional theory (Dacin et al., 2010,
2011; Mair & Marti, 2006, 2009; Zahra & Wright,
2011). Comparative entrepreneurship research draws
largely on economic institutional theory and the
rational, self-interested actor model, including the
importance of incentives (e.g., Aidis, Estrin, &
Mickiewicz, 2012; Bowen & De Clercq, 2008). How-
ever, the social entrepreneur’s decision and action
logic often relates to pro-social or “other” interests
(Santos, 2012; Zahra et al., 2009). Thus the inﬂuence
of formal and informal institutions may also differ.
First, whereas larger government may even deter
commercial entrepreneurship (CE) (Aidis et al.,
2012), it may beneﬁt social entrepreneurs who often
depend directly or indirectly on government support
to carry out their missions. Unis-Cité in France and
CDI in Brazil, described by Santos (2012), offer two
examples of social enterprises that initially relied on
private funding but achieved scale through their
government’s ﬁnancial support. Second, while cer-
tain cultural values (e.g., independence and auton-
omy) may pertain to both social and commercial
entrepreneurs, the importance of other values may
differ sharply. For instance, whereas postmaterialist
values and CE are negatively associated at the coun-
try (Uhlaner & Thurik, 2007), regional (Pinillos,
2011) and individual levels (Morales & Holtschlag,
2013), the opposite may be true for SE. Finally, to
develop a valid model of SE, one must consider an
institutional framework speciﬁc to SE (Dacin et al.,
2010) and one that jointly considers formal and
informal institutions.
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK: NATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND SE
Institutions refer to deep aspects of social structure,
which act as authoritative guidelines and constraints
for behavior (North, 1991, 2005; Scott, 2005). Insti-
tutions are taken-for-granted rules that can be expli-
cit and consciously perceived by individuals, or can
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act as implicit guidelines for individuals’ actions
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Formal institutions refer
to the objective constraints and incentives arising
from government regulation of individual and orga-
nizational actions (Bruton et al., 2010; Scott, 1995,
2005). Informal institutions refer to more implicit,
slowly changing, culturally transmitted and socially
constructed institutions. Scott’s (1995, 2005) three-
pillar framework further differentiates two types of
informal institutions, cognitive and normative, argu-
ably corresponding to the concepts of cultural values
and practices in cross-cultural research (Javidan,
House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006).
Speciﬁcally, cognitive institutions include the cultu-
rally shared understandings closely associated with
cultural values, whereas normative institutions
describe social obligations and expectations about
appropriate actions modeled on existing dominant
practices or norms in a given culture (Bruton et al.,
2010; Javidan et al., 2006; Scott, 2005; Stephan &
Uhlaner, 2010).
Separate disciplines deﬁne two streams of com-
parative entrepreneurship research, depending on
the institution (formal vs informal) chosen to pre-
dict entrepreneurship (Bruton et al., 2010; Jones,
Coviello, & Tang, 2011). Comparative entrepreneur-
ship research based on institutional economics
examines formal institutions (Autio & Acs, 2010;
Estrin, Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013b), whereas
that based on cultural sociology and cross-cultural
psychology typically examines informal institutions
(e.g., Autio, Pathak, & Wennberg, 2013). Although
institutional theorists in other research domains
have suggested the possibility of joint effects
(Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009; North, 2005),
empirical studies integrating both streams in com-
parative entrepreneurship research are still rare
(Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010).
In our proposed model (Figure 1), government
activism is an important formal regulatory institu-
tion affecting demand for SE (Dacin et al., 2010;
Estrin et al., 2013a). The prevalence of postmaterial-
ist cultural values (henceforth postmaterialism)
among a nation’s citizens represents the cognitive
pillar and enhances the supply of potential social
entrepreneurs within a country by motivating SE.
Socially supportive cultural norms (henceforth
socially supportive culture (SSC)) represent the nor-
mative pillar in our framework. SSC provides weak-
tie social capital, and thereby serves as an important
informal mechanism for lowering transaction costs
and providing access to much needed resources
(Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). We propose and test a
mixed-determinant, multilevel model (Kozlowski &
Klein, 2000) in which the three institutions of
government activism, postmaterialism, and SSC,
alone and in combination, affect an individual’s
probability of engaging in SE.
Individual level 
Country level 
Likelihood of individual engaging in social entrepreneurship 
H4 +H2 +
Controls  
• Age 
• Gender 
• Education
H3 - 
H5 +
Post-
materialism
cultural
values
(Motive) 
Socially
supportive
cultural norms   
 (Weak-tie social
capital)  
H1a - H1b +
Control 
• GDP 
Government activism
    Low: Demand for SE but
little resource support
High: Little demand but
potential resource support 
Figure 1 Research model: Institutional drivers of SE.
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Regulatory Institutional Context: Government
Activism (Hypothesis 1)
Government activism reﬂects the extent to which a
nation’s formal institutions redistribute economic
wealth through progressive tax structures and
spending to provide for the common welfare of its
citizens (Aidis et al., 2012; Castles & Dowrick, 1990).
It thus reﬂects a government’s ability to address
social issues and provide public goods. Hypotheses
1a and 1b propose opposite inﬂuences of govern-
ment activism on SE based on the institutional void
and support perspectives.
Government activism in the institutional void perspective
(Hypothesis 1a)
Whereas in the IB literature, the term institutional
void typically refers to the absence of strong rule of
law (Carney et al., 2009; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001), in
the SE literature the term describes conditions of
limited government support especially for social
programs. Under such conditions, social needs such
as poverty or environmental pollution are more
abundant, triggering greater demand for SE (Dacin
et al., 2010; Estrin et al., 2013a; Mair & Marti, 2009;
Zahra et al., 2009). According to this perspective,
government inactivity motivates social enterprises
and others in the private sector to ﬁll this gap, or
“void.” Conversely, the presence of active and
engaged governments leads to fewer societal pro-
blems and lower demand for SE, and thus fewer
individuals are likely to be motivated to engage in
SE. Mair, Battilana, and Cárdenas’s (2012) content
analysis of 200 social enterprise proﬁles supports this
view. Social enterprises frequently appear where
governments fail to provide for social needs such as
adequate health care, children’s social services, or
environmental protection. In a cross-national quan-
titative study, Estrin et al. (2013a) ﬁnd that more
government activism is negatively correlated with SE
start-up efforts.
Within research on nonproﬁts, government fail-
ure theory provides parallel arguments (Nissan,
Castaño, & Carrasco, 2012; Salamon & Anheier,
1998): When governments fail to provide public
goods and social welfare, nonproﬁts step in to
provide such goods and services. Conversely, it is
argued that a larger, wealth-redistributing welfare
state crowds out private pro-social initiatives
(e.g., Warr, 1982). A cross-national study supports
government failure theory, that is, less active gov-
ernments are correlated with a larger nonproﬁt
sector (Matsunaga, Yamauchi, & Okuyama, 2010).
In line with the institutional void perspective, we
thus propose:
Hypothesis 1a: Government activism at the
national level is negatively associated with the
likelihood of individuals engaging in SE.
Government activism in the institutional support
perspective (Hypothesis 1b)
In contrast to Hypothesis 1a, one can also argue that
government activism, by providing tangible and
intangible resource support for social entrepreneurs,
can enhance SE (Evans, 1996; Korosec & Berman,
2006; Zahra & Wright, 2011). Tangible resources
include grants, subsidies, and other direct funding.
Less tangible resources may include assistance with
completion of grant applications, endorsements,
and sponsorship of activities that help social enter-
prises to network with each other or with other
stakeholders (Korosec & Berman, 2006; Meyskens,
Carsrud, & Cardozo, 2010b; Meyskens, Robb-Post,
Stamp, Carsrud, & Reynolds, 2010a).
In this view, which we label as the institutional
support perspective, a key role of government is to
provide public goods and to look after the welfare of
citizens, while social entrepreneurs create their enter-
prises to address social needs. Thus government and
social enterprises could be regarded as natural partners
to achieve social goals (Sud, van Sandt, & Baugous,
2009; Zahra & Wright, 2011). More active govern-
ments may augment the social entrepreneur’s perso-
nal resources or those gained through the entrepre-
neurs’ informal social networks. In a sample of US
counties, Saxton and Benson (2005) ﬁnd a positive
relationship between government activism and the
creation of nonproﬁt organizations. Marcuello (1998)
presents similar evidence for 40 Spanish counties. The
previouslymentioned case examples of CDI and Unis-
Cité also illustrate such governmental support for
social entrepreneurs (Santos, 2012). These studies
highlight the importance of resource support pro-
vided by active governments.
Thus consistent with the institutional support
perspective, we propose:
Hypothesis 1b: Government activism at the
national level is positively associated with the
likelihood of individuals engaging in SE.
Cognitive Institutional Context: Postmaterialism
(Hypotheses 2 and 3)
Career decision-making research highlights indivi-
duals’ values as key determinants of their occupational
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decisions (Knafo & Sagiv, 2004; Noseleit, 2010).
Decisions about whether to engage in SE are argu-
ably the type of deliberate decisions that are well
predicted by values (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, &
Knafo, 2002). Cultural values reﬂect the importance
of certain values for a country’s population, that is,
the aggregate of personally important goals that a
country’s citizens hold (Schwartz, 2006). The aggre-
gate trait hypothesis (Davidsson & Wiklund, 1997;
Uhlaner & Thurik, 2007) has been used to explain
why cross-cultural differences in values explain dif-
ferences in individual occupational choices for CE.
When applied to SE, the aggregate trait view main-
tains that the greater the number of people in a
country who hold values consistent with SE, the
greater the number of individuals in that country
who will be motivated to engage in SE, and hence
the greater will be the aggregate supply of potential
social entrepreneurs.
Social entrepreneurs strive to achieve pro-social
goals and generate societal wealth through their
ventures. This suggests that individuals with pro-
social values will be more attracted to SE. At the same
time, as with entrepreneurs in general (Noseleit,
2010), an individual who chooses to become a social
entrepreneur must be comfortable with autonomy
and enjoy making independent decisions. Indeed,
evidence at the individual level suggests that social
entrepreneurs strongly value both pro-sociality
and autonomy (Egri & Herman, 2000; Stephan,
Huysentruyt, & Van Looy, 2010) – a joint preference
encapsulated by postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1997;
Wilson, 2005). Other research demonstrates that
postmaterialism at the individual level is related to
pro-environmental attitudes, volunteering, and poli-
tical activism (Bekkers, 2005; Franzen & Meyer,
2010; Opp, 1990).
In sum, if a country has more individuals who
value postmaterialism, according to the aggregate
trait hypothesis we would expect individuals in such
a country to be more likely to engage in SE. Thus:
Hypothesis 2: National-level postmaterialism is
positively associated with the likelihood of indivi-
duals engaging in SE.
Entrepreneurial action has often been conceived as
a product of the person and a situation that provides
an opportunity to act entrepreneurially (Shane &
Venkataraman, 2000). Thus widespread postmateri-
alism in a country may not be sufﬁcient to stimulate
a large number of people to become social entrepre-
neurs unless there are opportunities to act upon
those values. In this regard, Bornstein’s (2007) series
of biographies of social entrepreneurs highlights
how entrepreneurs’ values, together with their expo-
sure to human suffering, motivated them to act. One
such biography is that of Vera Cordeiro, who created
Renascer to enhance illness prevention in Brazil
through empowering and training poor families.
In keeping with the institutional void perspec-
tive and that of institutional conﬁgurations, we
hypothesize that individuals are more likely to
engage in SE in countries where there is greater social
need and demand for SE (i.e., less government
activism) and a higher proportion of non-materially
motivated individuals (i.e., the percentage of the
population with postmaterialist values):
Hypothesis 3: The impact of nation-level gov-
ernment activism on the likelihood of individuals
engaging in SE is negatively moderated by nation-
level postmaterialism, such that individuals are
most likely to engage in SE where government
activism is low and postmaterialism is high.
Normative Institutional Context: SSC (Hypotheses
4 and 5)
SSC refers to informal cultural norms that encourage
cooperation based on repeated experiences of friend-
liness, supportiveness, cooperation, and helpfulness
(Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010: 1351). SSC arguably
captures the most generic aspects of (weak-tie) social
capital at the national level, that is, norms that
facilitate interaction and cooperation even among
strangers (Fukuyama, 2001; Westlund & Adam,
2010). Research has shown that national-level SSC
positively affects CE (Autio et al., 2013; Stephan &
Uhlaner, 2010). Related nation-level research obser-
ves similar positive associations of other aspects of
social capital (trust and association activity) with both
CE (De Clercq, Danis, & Dakhli, 2010) and opportu-
nity recognition (Kwon & Arenius, 2010).
SSC is particularly important in stimulating SE for
two reasons. First, SSC serves as a model of coopera-
tive and caring behavior, which should inﬂuence
more individuals within a society to choose SE as an
occupation. Therefore, SSC affects the motivation
and supply of potential social entrepreneurs in a
country. Second, social entrepreneurs face require-
ments similar to those of commercial entrepre-
neurs in terms of gaining access to and assembling
resources. In this regard, social capital can lower
transaction costs by enabling resource access
through collaboration and cooperation (Meyskens
et al., 2010a; Meyskens et al., 2010b). Similarly, in
order to achieve social impact and introduce social
Institutions and social entrepreneurship Ute Stephan et al
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change, social entrepreneurs need to build collabora-
tive relationships with numerous diverse stake-
holders (DiDomenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010; Mair
& Marti, 2009). This is probably easier in cultures in
which weak-tie social capital facilitates contact
and cooperation even among strangers. Katre and
Salipante’s (2012) analysis of 31 social entrepreneurs
underscores the importance of weak-tie social
capital, revealing that more successful social entrepre-
neurs go beyond their existing networks and initiate
new relationships to secure pro-bono and ﬁnancial
resources for product/service exploration. Thus:
Hypothesis 4: National-level SSC is positively
associated with the likelihood of individuals enga-
ging in SE.
As noted in Hypothesis 3, clusters of national
institutions may have different effects depending
on particular combinations. SSC may serve to
enhance and supplement the effect of active govern-
ment. Similarly, active governments may be seen as
more “caring” because, by deﬁnition, they provide
social welfare to a greater extent and thus reinforce
norms of supportiveness in the broader society. This
idea of synergy between government involvement
and informal, private cooperative efforts is not new
among political scientists and development econo-
mists (Skocpol, 2008; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).
We argue that the positive effects of formal institu-
tional support (government activism) are reinforced
by informal cooperative norms (SSC), and conse-
quently enable SE. Thus:
Hypothesis 5: The impact of nation-level gov-
ernment activism on the likelihood of individuals
engaging in SE is positively moderated by nation-
level SSC, such that individuals are most likely to
engage in SE where government activism and SSC
are high.
METHOD
Overview of the Sample and Data Sources
We tested our model (Figure 1) using a multilevel
design in which individuals (Level 1) were nested
within countries (Level 2). The data came from
several independent and publicly available sources.
Individual-level data were collected in 2009 through
a large population-representative survey, the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (Global Entrepre-
neurship Research Association, 2013; Lepoutre et al.,
2013; Terjesen, Lepoutre, Justo & Bosma, 2012). In
GEM surveys, individuals are randomly chosen,
although the sampling method varies in order to
adjust for country-speciﬁc conditions (e.g., random
dials from telephone lists in countries such as Spain
or Slovenia; multi-stage random walks in South
Africa, China, and Guatemala). Individuals were
thus either interviewed over the phone or face-to-
face. A number of procedures (e.g., the number of
callbacks required for telephone and face-to-face
interviews) were standardized. More detail about
the protocols, including steps taken to assure com-
parability across countries, is included in the GEM
manual (Bosma, Coduras, Litovsky, & Seaman,
2012). Lepoutre et al. (2013: 698) provide speciﬁc
information on data collection protocols per coun-
try for 2009.
Data for country-level variables were collected
from 1995 through 2008, and came from the World
Values Survey (WVS), the “Global Leadership and
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness” GLOBE data-
base, Heritage Foundation, and the World Bank. We
lagged all country-level variables by at least 1 year to
reduce potential endogeneity between the hypothe-
sized antecedents and the outcome, SE.
The 2009 GEM survey was conducted in 49 coun-
tries. Twenty-three countries for which data were
missing, either in GEM or in the country-level data
sources (WVS, GLOBE), were excluded. (Japan,
although it participated in the 2009 GEM survey,
skipped the SE-related questions.) Within countries
we restricted the sample to adults aged 18–64 years,
that is, the typical working-aged adult population.
Our ﬁnal sample consisted of 106,484 individuals
from 26 countries for whom full information on
socio-demographic variables and SE was available.
The number of respondents per country ranged from
1498 to 28,632 with a median of 2000 respondents.
Table 1 lists the countries included in our study and
provides country-level summary statistics. In terms
of development stage, three countries in our sample
were “factor-driven”, nine “efﬁciency-driven”, and
the remainder “innovation-driven” economies
(Lepoutre et al., 2013).
Dependent Variable at the Individual Level: SE
The SE survey questions (Appendix A) were devel-
oped based on the SE literature and via GEM pilot
studies in the United Kingdom (Lepoutre et al.,
2013; Levie, Brooksbank, Jones-Evans, Harding, &
Hart, 2006) before they were implemented in the
2009 GEM survey. GEM took a broad view of SE and
included enterprises with purely social and environ-
mental goals (such as nonproﬁts) as well as hybrids,
for example, commercial enterprises reporting that
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they worked predominantly on social/environmen-
tal issues. This is in line with the generally accepted
notion that SE is not constrained to a speciﬁc legal
form (Mair & Marti, 2006).
We used one primary indicator to measure the
dependent variable that reﬂects individuals’ engage-
ment in SE. Individuals were coded=1 if they met
criteria for either a nascent or operating social
entrepreneur, or=0 otherwise. Appendix A provides
a detailed ﬂow chart of the actual survey questions.
To summarize, individuals were classiﬁed as nascent
social entrepreneurs when they indicated that they
had taken steps in the past 12 months toward
creating a social enterprise that they would either
partly or fully manage, but that the social enterprise
had not provided services or received external
funding for more than 3 months. Respondents were
classiﬁed as operating social entrepreneurs when
they were partly or fully managing a social enterprise
that was actively trading at the time.
A second SE measure, “revenue-generating SE”,
was included as a robustness check, as some argue
that revenue-generation through market-based
transactions constitutes the “entrepreneurial” ele-
ment in SE (Lepoutre et al., 2013; Stephan, 2010).
Revenue-generating social entrepreneurs were a sub-
set of social entrepreneurs as identiﬁed above who
indicated that at least some of the revenue for their
activity had come (or would come) from income
generated through sales of products or services (see
Appendix A). Individuals were coded=1 if engaging
in revenue-generating SE, and=0 otherwise.
Table 1 Country-level descriptive statistics
Country Na % Social
entrepreneurship
(SE)
% SE
revenue-
generating
Government
activism
(0–100)
Postmaterialism
(%)
Socially
supportive
cultural
norms
GDP Age
(1 – lowest to
5 – highest)
Gender
% male
Education
(0 – lowest to
6 – highest)
Argentina 1674 8.06 2.57 24.28 19.80 0.12 14,413 3.05 41.34 3.14
Brazil 2000 0.50 0.05 37.92 11.00 −0.24 10,405 2.75 48.90 2.42
China 3405 1.62 1.06 21.95 4.00 1.32 6202 2.96 48.08 2.71
Colombia 2031 1.48 0.89 28.00 18.60 −0.12 8957 2.87 49.14 3.08
Denmark 1999 12.16 6.20 72.59 16.10 1.30 39,830 3.55 46.07 3.77
Finland 1988 4.38 2.92 53.30 11.15 0.68 38,081 3.20 50.40 3.48
France 1623 2.16 1.05 66.81 17.75 −0.79 34,041 3.12 48.98 3.11
Germany 5865 1.14 0.63 53.78 16.40 −1.57 37,119 3.22 50.88 3.59
Greece 1970 1.88 0.81 38.31 16.70 −1.19 29,604 3.30 48.63 3.49
Guatemala 2148 0.14 0.14 12.12 7.50 0.49 4739 2.65 44.55 1.64
Hungary 1964 1.22 0.76 51.73 2.40 −1.55 20,432 2.99 50.41 2.96
Iran 3130 0.89 0.54 17.16 9.95 0.75 11,289 2.58 54.06 2.71
Israel 1832 2.84 1.31 54.49 12.60 0.27 25,600 2.87 41.87 3.76
Italy 2930 0.92 0.24 58.13 23.85 −0.12 33,372 3.42 49.86 3.01
Malaysia 1975 0.20 0.10 18.49 7.10 1.91 14,561 3.30 61.42 2.61
Morocco 1498 0.67 0.20 30.73 6.50 −0.14 4313 2.57 50.00 1.46
The Netherlands 2126 1.60 0.89 55.11 19.65 −0.29 42,915 3.64 46.05 3.25
Russia 1631 0.25 0.06 25.69 1.80 0.84 20,276 2.99 47.64 4.02
Slovenia 3014 3.05 1.76 52.23 15.60 0.19 29,074 3.13 46.78 3.50
South Africa 2793 1.11 0.61 26.82 7.70 0.17 10,427 2.55 48.73 2.40
South Korea 1940 0.31 0.05 25.81 3.85 −0.48 26,689 2.90 50.62 3.88
Spain 28,632 0.56 0.18 44.65 14.65 −1.09 33,158 3.39 49.39 3.13
Switzerland 1516 0.99 0.53 35.22 24.30 −0.36 47,946 3.41 40.30 3.54
UK 21,906 3.67 1.85 49.39 23.80 −0.22 36,062 3.58 39.07 3.64
USA 3340 2.93 1.32 35.93 21.75 −0.16 46,760 3.71 49.52 3.92
Venezuela 1554 1.29 0.58 22.87 14.40 0.29 12,895 2.78 41.06 2.97
Total/Meanb 106,484 2.15 1.05 38.98 13.42 0.00 24,583 3.10 47.84 3.12
SDb 2.65 1.29 16.45 6.87 0.85 13,725 0.34 4.69 0.65
aUnequal sample sizes per country are due to varying resources available for GEM data collection.
bWeighted, giving equal weight to each country.
Institutions and social entrepreneurship Ute Stephan et al
7
Journal of International Business Studies
Country-Level Predictors
Government activism
In line with past research on nonproﬁt and com-
parative entrepreneurship (Aidis et al., 2012; Nissan
et al., 2012; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2003), we
included the variable government activism to esti-
mate the ability of the government to address social
issues as a function of progressive taxation and over-
all spending. We used the version of government
activism developed and validated by Aidis et al.
(2012), which was based on mean country scores
for “ﬁscal freedom” and “government size”, two sub-
indicators available from the Heritage Foundation’s
“Index of Economic Freedom” (Beach & Kane, 2008;
Heritage Foundation, 2010) (Cronbach’s α=0.72 for
our 26-country sample). The “ﬁscal freedom” sub-
indicator, a taxation variable reﬂecting wealth redis-
tribution, included a country’s tax revenue as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) as well
as the top marginal tax rate on corporate and
individual income. The “government size” sub-indi-
cator reﬂects total government expenditure as a
percentage of GDP and covers several aspects of the
welfare state (e.g., provision of health services, edu-
cation, pensions, unemployment insurance, and
services such as skills development) (Beach & Kane,
2008).2 We used information on government acti-
vism for 2008, with higher values reﬂecting more
taxation and spending, and thus higher government
activism.
Postmaterialism
Postmaterialism was measured using the 4-item ver-
sion of the postmaterialism index developed by
Inglehart (1997), which is available from the World
Values Survey (WVS, 2010) – a population-represen-
tative survey. The 4-item postmaterialism index has
been widely used in research in political science,
sociology, and psychology (Bekkers, 2005; Franzen
& Meyer, 2010; Moors, 2007), and also in entrepre-
neurship (Uhlaner & Thurik, 2007).3 Researchers
have found that postmaterialism is highly stable
and that it changes primarily through intergenera-
tional replacement and socialization rather than
through intra-individual value changes (Inglehart,
2008; Kroh, 2009). We used data from the 1999–
2002 and 2005–2008 waves, computing the average
rate across the two waves when a country partici-
pated in both periods. The stability of postmaterial-
ism between the two waves was conﬁrmed by a
strong positive correlation between them (r=0.86,
p<0.001, N=21). The score used in the analyses
(Table 1) reﬂects the percentage of individuals in each
country’s sample that were scored as postmaterialists
(see Appendix B).
Socially supportive culture
SSC is an index based on GLOBE cultural practices
data. From 1995 to 1997, the GLOBE project sur-
veyed matched samples of 17,370 middle managers
from 951 local companies in three industrial sectors
(food-processing, ﬁnance, and telecommunications)
to arrive at country-level scores (House, Hanges,
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). House et al.
(2004) provide a description of the methodology,
and identify nine cultural practice dimensions that
emerged from multilevel factor analyses and which
show high internal reliability, high inter-rater agree-
ment, and were validated against multiple macro-
level indices. SSC, a second-order dimension
developed and validated by Stephan and Uhlaner
(2010), consists of an average of two of these
dimensions – humane orientation and assertive-
ness (the latter being reverse scored, see Appendix B;
Cronbach’s α= 0.75, reported in Stephan &
Uhlaner, 2010, and 0.61 in the present sample).4
Higher values on SSC indicate more supportive
cultures characterized by greater ease of con-
tact, positive interpersonal climate, and norms of
cooperation.
Individual-Level Controls
Gender
Research suggests that men are somewhat more
likely than women to engage in SE (Estrin et al.,
2013a). We controlled at the individual level for
gender (female=0, male=1).
Age and age-squared
Evidence suggests that younger individuals may be
more inclined to engage in SE (Lepoutre et al., 2013),
and there may also be covariance between younger
generations and postmaterialism (Inglehart & Baker,
2000). Other evidence indicates that age may have an
inverted-U effect on SE (Estrin et al., 2013a). Thus we
included respondents’ age and age-squared as con-
trol variables. Respondents reported their age in the
following categories: 18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54,
and 55–64, which we coded as categories 1–5,
respectively.
Education
Research suggests that education is positively
related to SE (Estrin et al., 2013a). There is also a
Institutions and social entrepreneurship Ute Stephan et al
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long-standing debate about the possible confound-
ing effects between education and postmaterialism
(Abramson & Inglehart, 1994; Warwick, 1998). Thus
we controlled for respondents’ education level
coded as pre-primary=0, primary/ﬁrst stage basic
education=1, lower secondary/second stage basic
education=2, upper secondary=3, post-secondary,
non-tertiary education=4, ﬁrst stage of tertiary edu-
cation=5, and second stage of tertiary education=6.
Country-Level Controls
National wealth (GDP)
National wealth has been associated with the
prevalence of SE (Lepoutre et al., 2013) and with
postmaterialism (Abramson & Inglehart, 1994). For
the current study, we adopted accepted best practice
in IB and entrepreneurship research (Aidis et al.,
2012; Levie & Autio, 2011; Uhlaner & Thurik, 2007)
to deal with potential endogeneity of national
wealth with our predictors by including it as a
control variable. To measure national wealth, we
used 2008 GDP per capita in purchasing power
standards expressed in millions of international
dollars, henceforth referred to as GDP (World Bank,
2012).
GDP growth
Since changes in national wealth may also impact SE
or postmaterialism, we included GDP growth for
2008 (World Bank, 2013) as a control variable for
selected robustness checks.
Rule of law
For another robustness check, we added a rule of law
measure as a control variable from the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator database
(2012; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011) to test
whether or not our results would be better explained
by this constitutional-level formal institution (Estrin
et al., 2013a). The indicator reﬂects perceptions of
the quality of the rule of law (in 2008), including the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
police, and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence.
Data Analysis
We tested our hypotheses by ﬁtting a series of
logistic multilevel regression models since our aim
was to explain how an individual’s SE, a binary
variable with an assumed Bernoulli distribution, is
inﬂuenced by country-level institutional contexts.
Our models were estimated in R (R Foundation,
2012) using the Laplace approximation. Performing
a multilevel analysis has three advantages over a
conventional single-level regression analysis. First,
it reduces the risk of Type I errors that would occur
through not acknowledging the existence of a
higher level, and treating all variables as if they were
observed at (and therefore had the sample size
of) the individual level. Second, it also offers
an improvement over the option of aggregating
the data to the country level, which substantially
reduces the sample size and also carries the risk of
aggregation biases that occur when constructs or
relationships at the individual level are generalized
to the country level, an artifact known as “ecological
fallacy” (Peterson, Arregle, & Martin, 2012). Third,
multilevel regressions enabled us to account for
clustering, that is, non-independence of observa-
tions within the same countries. Individuals within
a country share common experiences that differ
from those of individuals living in other countries.
The Type 1 intra-class correlations (ICC(1)) (Hox,
2010) for SE and the alternative dependent variable,
“revenue-generating SE”, provided evidence of such
clustering: the observed values of 0.24 and 0.28,
respectively, indicate that 24% and 28% of the total
variance resided at the country level for SE and
revenue-generating SE. That is, a large proportion of
their variance resided at the country level. ICC(1)s
exceeding 0.15 are deemed large (Hox, 2010).
In line with Bryk and Raudenbush (2002), we
standardized all independent variables. Country-
level variables were standardized based on their
county-level mean and standard deviation. Indivi-
dual-level variables were grand-mean standardized,
that is, standardized based on their individual-level
mean and standard deviation across the sample.
(Robustness checks using group-mean centered indi-
vidual-level controls yielded the same results, which
are available from the authors.) The centering
implicit within standardization also sidestepped
the systematic multicollinearity between main and
interaction effects as speciﬁed in Hypotheses 3 and 5
(Dawson, 2014). Standardizing as opposed to just
centering enabled the simple illustration of interac-
tion effects by plotting the standardized scores of the
relevant variables at 0.5 and 1 standard deviation
above, below, and at their mean against the indivi-
dual’s likelihood of engaging in SE (Dawson, 2014;
Hox, 2010).
We used the variance inﬂation factor (VIF) and the
condition index statistic (CIS) to test for multicolli-
nearity displayed in Table 2. Both statistics suggested
that no multicollinearity was present among our
Institutions and social entrepreneurship Ute Stephan et al
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country-level predictor variables as the VIF scores
were <10 and the CIS <30 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham,
& Black, 1998).
We ﬁrst tested main effects (Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2,
and 4) with all control variables and all three inde-
pendent variables included in the model, but with-
out the added interaction terms. To test for the
interaction effects (Hypotheses 3 and 5), we initially
assessed each interaction term individually. We then
carried out a series of robustness checks: (1) for
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, adding each predictor
(government activism, postmaterialism, and SSC)
alone as recommended by Parboteeah, Hoegl, and
Cullen (2008) for small country samples; and (2) for
Hypotheses 3 and 5, including both interaction
terms together. Further robustness checks for
Hypotheses 3 and 5 included: (1) adding GDP
growth; (2) adding Rule of Law as an additional
control variable; and (3) substituting revenue-gener-
ating SE as a dependent variable.5
For each model, in addition to the estimated
regression coefﬁcients B, we report the results of the
change-in-deviance, or likelihood ratio, test (Hox,
2010) to establish whether the model is a signiﬁcant
improvement over the previous model. To provide
an effect size for the predictor(s) added at each stage,
we also report the change in the proportion of
country-level variance explained by a model relative
to its preceding model, calculated as change in
“pseudo R2” (Hox, 2010: 71).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and
Multicollinearity
Table 3 displays correlations for the individual-level
variables, and Table 4 for the country-level variables.
Hypotheses Tests Using Multilevel Modeling
The models used to test the hypotheses are displayed
in Table 5. Model 1 includes individual-level
(Level 1) and country-level (Level 2) control variables.
Model 2 adds the main effects of our three focal
predictors. Model 3 adds the ﬁrst interaction term
(government activism ∗postmaterialism), and Model
4 replaces this with the second hypothesized interac-
tion term (government activism∗SSC). Models
5–14 present the aforementioned supplementary ana-
lyses to check the robustness of the results of, and
hence the conclusions drawn fromModels 1 to 4.
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4: Government Activism,
Postmaterialism, SSC, and SE
Model 2 of Table 5 shows a positive effect of govern-
ment activism on SE supporting the institutional
support perspective (Hypothesis 1b) but not the
institutional void perspective (Hypothesis 1a).
These results also support the positive relationship
between postmaterialism and SE as predicted in
Hypothesis 2. The positive effects of government
activism and postmaterialism were replicated in
robustness checks when entered alone (Models 6
and 7, respectively, Table 5).
We also found a positive but less robust relation-
ship between SSC and SE as predicted in Hypothesis
4. SSC impacted SE in combination with the other
two predictor variables (Model 2), but not when
entered alone (Model 8). Especially given the low
multicollinearity between SSC and the other two
predictors (Tables 3 and 4), these ﬁndings suggest a
reciprocal suppression effect (Maassen & Bakker,
2001: 245). Reciprocal suppression occurs when two
variables share information irrelevant to the depen-
dent variable but in opposite directions. When
both variables are included in the regression, they
Table 2 Multicollinearity tests
Dependent variable Main model Robustness checks
Social entrepreneurship (SE) SE SE Revenue-generating SE
VIFa VIFa VIFa VIFa
Government activism 1.960 2.078 2.410 1.960
Postmaterialism 1.640 1.645 1.803 1.640
Socially supportive cultural norms 1.161 1.263 1.162 1.161
GDP 2.530 3.148 6.035 2.530
GDP growth 2.554
Rule of law 5.735
Condition index for model 3.027 3.705 5.838 3.027
aVIF=Variance inflation factors.
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suppress part of each other’s irrelevant information.
Our results suggest that SSC has an important addi-
tive effect on SE but only in combination with the
other two institutional variables.
This joint effect is underscored by the fact that the
three predictors considered together explained 5%
more of the country-level variation in individual SE
(Model 2) compared with their additive effects in
Models 6, 7, and 8. This supports the notion of
institutional conﬁgurations. Overall, the three main
predictors jointly explained 35% of the country-
level variation (corresponding to 8.4% of the
total variation) in individuals’ engagement in SE
(Model 2).
Hypotheses 3 and 5: Interactive Effects of
Government Activism, Postmaterialism, and SSC
We found a signiﬁcant, negative interaction effect of
postmaterialism with government activism on SE
(Model 3) but its precise form was in line with the
institutional support perspective and not the institu-
tional void perspective originally hypothesized.
Thus the results provide only partial support for
Hypothesis 3. Comparing Models 2 and 3, we see
that the interaction term explains an additional
17% of country-level variance. Figure 2 displays this
interaction, illustrating that strong postmaterialism
may compensate for low government activism,
while making little difference at medium to higher
levels of government activism. Thus the interaction
qualiﬁed the institutional support effect of govern-
ment activism on SE – it held especially under low to
medium–high levels but was weaker at very high
levels of postmaterialism. These ﬁndings hold in
further robustness checks (Models 9, 11, and 13,
Table 5).
As predicted by Hypothesis 5, and shown inModel
4 (Table 5), we found support for a positive interac-
tion of government activism and SSC. A comparison
of Models 2 and 4 shows that this interaction term
explains an additional 6% of the country-level var-
iance in SE. As displayed in Figure 3, and in line with
Hypothesis 5, SSC further enhanced the positive
effect of government activism on SE such that
the highest level of SE was found in countries that
have both a strong SSC and a more active govern-
ment. This interaction effect was replicated in two of
the three robustness checks, with alternate sets of
controls (Models 10 and 12), but was not robust for
revenue-generating SE (Model 14) or when both
interaction terms were entered together in the same
model (Model 5). A similar, mixed picture emerged
from additional robustness checks (which are avail-
able from the authors upon request). For instance,
the interaction effect was signiﬁcant when GDP was
removed but not signiﬁcant when Denmark (which
could be considered to be an outlier) was removed
from the sample. These mixed results are likely due
Table 4 Country-level correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Social entrepreneurship (SE) —
(2) Revenue-generating SE 0.965***
(3) Government activism 0.442* 0.511**
(4) Postmaterialism 0.325 0.269 0.429*
(5) Socially supportive cultural norms 0.251 0.291 −0.342† −0.268
(6) GDP 0.296 0.347† 0.688*** 0.612*** −0.322
(7) GDP growth −0.191 −0.264 −0.641*** −0.495* 0.444* −0.732***
(8) Rule of law 0.320 0.411* 0.751*** 0. 411* −0.318 0.875*** −0.682***
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed), N= 26.
Table 3 Individual-level correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Social entrepreneurship (SE) —
(2) Revenue-generating SE 0.694***
(3) Age (1 – lowest to 5 – highest) 0.016*** 0.010**
(4) Gender (0 – female, 1 –male) 0.021*** 0.021*** −0.004
(5) Education (0 – lowest to 6 – highest) 0.079*** 0.057*** −0.052*** 0.007*
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed), N= 106,484, weighted giving equal weight to each country in sample.
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Table 5 Effects of institutions on individual engagement in SE (Regression coefficients (B))
Main results
Controls Main effects Main+GA∗PM
interaction
Main+GA∗SSC
interaction
Main+both
interactions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
B p s.e. B p s.e. B p s.e. B p s.e. B p s.e.
Fixed effects
Intercept −4.35*** 0.19 −4.35*** 0.15 −4.09*** 0.1 −4.25*** 0.15 −4.07*** 0.14
Level 1 (controls)
Age 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Age-squared −0.07** 0.02 −0.07** 0.03 −0.07** 0.03 −0.07** 0.03 −0.07** 0.03
Gender 0.17*** 0.03 0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02
Education 0.59*** 0.02 0.59*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03
Level 2 (controls)
GDP 0.25 0.19 −0.43† 0.24 −0.39* 0.19 −0.44* 0.22 −0.40* 0.19
Level 2 (predictors)
Government activism (GA) 0.64** 0.21 0.68*** 0.17 0.52** 0.20 0.62*** 0.18
Postmaterialism (PM) 0.52** 0.19 0.46** 0.16 0.46* 0.18 0.44** 0.16
Socially supportive cultural norms (SSC) 0.29† 0.16 0.50*** 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.43** 0.15
Interaction GA∗PM −0.62*** 0.17 −0.56** 0.18
Interaction GA∗SSC 0.28† 0.15 0.14 0.13
Random effects and model fit
Residual country-level variance 0.86 0.49 0.31 0.42 0.30
Deviance (−2 log likelihood) 18,484 18,470 18,459 18,466 18,458
Degrees of freedom (df) 7 10 11 11 12
Δ pseudo-R2 from M0a 0.19
Δ pseudo-R2 from M1 0.35
χ2 (df) from M1 13.81**(3)
Δ pseudo-R2 from M2 0.17 0.06 0.18
χ2 (df) from M2 10.61**(1) 3.45†(1) 11.71** (2)
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First robustness checks
Controls+GA only Controls+PM only Controls+SSC only
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
B p s.e. B p s.e. B p s.e.
Fixed effects
Intercept −4.35*** 0.17 −4.35*** 0.18 −4.34*** 0.19
Level 1 (controls)
Age 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Age-squared −0.07** 0.03 −0.07** 0.03 −0.07** 0.03
Gender 0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02
Education 0.59*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03
Level 2 (controls)
GDP −0.15 0.24 −0.05 0.23 0.30 0.20
Level 2 (predictors)
Government activism (GA) 0.58* 0.24
Postmaterialism (PM) 0.49* 0.23
Socially supportive cultural norms (SSC) 0.16 0.20
Interaction GA∗PM
Interaction GA∗SSC
Random effects and model fit
Residual country-level variance 0.70 0.74 0.82
Deviance (−2 log likelihood) 18,478 18,479 18,483
Degrees of freedom (df) 8 8 8
Δ pseudo-R2 from M0a
Δ pseudo-R2 from M1 0.15 0.12 0.03
χ2 (df) from M1 5.42* (1) 4.25* (1) 0.62 n.s. (1)
Δ pseudo-R2 from M2
χ2 (df) from M2
Table 5 Continued
In
stitu
tio
n
s
an
d
so
cialen
trep
ren
eu
rsh
ip
U
te
Stephan
et
al
1
3
JournalofInternationalBusiness
Studies
Table 5: Continued
Further robustness checks
Adding GDP growth as control Adding rule of law as a control
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Robustness check for Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4
B p s.e. B p s.e. B p s.e. B p s.e.
Fixed effects
Intercept −4.10*** 0.14 −4.24*** 0.14 −4.10*** 0.13 −4.25*** 0.14
Level 1 (controls)
Age 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Age-squared −0.07** 0.03 −0.07** 0.03 −0.07** 0.03 −0.07** 0.03
Gender 0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02
Education 0.59*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03 0.59*** 0.03
Level 2 (controls)
GDP −0.34 0.22 −0.29 0.24 −0.65* 0.31 −0.82* 0.34
GDP growth 0.10 0.19 0.29 0.21
Rule of law 0.32 0.30 0.48 0.34
Level 2 (predictors)
Government activism (GA) 0.71*** 0.17 0.57** 0.20 0.59** 0.18 0.38† 0.22
Postmaterialism (PM) 0.47** 0.16 0.47** 0.17 0.53** 0.16 0.55** 0.19
Socially supportive cultural norms (SSC) 0.48** 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.50*** 0.13 0.20 0.15
Interaction GA∗PM −0.60*** 0.17 −0.60*** 0.17
Interaction GA∗SSC 0.31* 0.14 0.29* 0.14
Random effects and model fit
Residual country-level variance 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.39
Deviance (−2 log likelihood) 18,459 18,465 18,458 18,464
Total df 12 12 12 12
Total pseudo-R2 beyond controls 0.52 0.43 0.50 0.41
Δ pseudo-R2 Controls to Main model 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.34
χ2 Controls to Main (df) 14.74**(3) 14.74**(3) 14.05**(3) 14.05**(3)
Δ pseudo-R2 Main to Interaction model 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.07
χ2 Main to Interaction model (df) 9.86**(1) 4.19*(1) 10.35**(1) 4.01*(1)
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Further robustness checks
Revenue-generating SE
Model 13 Model 14
Robustness check for Model 3 Model 4
B p s.e. B p s.e.
Fixed effects
Intercept −4.83*** 0.17 −5.05*** 0.18
Level 1 (controls)
Age 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
Age-squared −0.10** 0.04 −0.10** 0.04
Gender 0.23*** 0.03 0.23*** 0.03
Education 0.59*** 0.04 0.60*** 0.04
Level 2 (controls)
GDP −0.33 0.24 −0.36 0.28
GDP growth
Rule of law
Level 2 (predictors)
Government activism (GA) 0.69*** 0.20 0.55* 0.25
Postmaterialism (PM) 0.41* 0.19 0.43† 0.23
Socially supportive cultural norms (SSC) 0.60*** 0.17 0.30 0.19
Interaction GA∗PM −0.68** 0.21
Interaction GA∗SSC 0.18 0.18
Random effects and model fit
Residual country-level variance 0.43 0.62
Deviance (−2 log likelihood) 10,380 10,388
Total df 11 11
Total pseudo-R2 beyond controls 0.49 0.34
Δ pseudo-R2 Controls to Main model 0.31 0.31
χ2 Controls to Main (df) 10.16*(3) 10.16*(3)
Δ pseudo-R2 Main to Interaction model 0.18 0.03
χ2 Main to Interaction model (df) 8.84**(1) 0.94(1)
N=106,484 at individual-level, n=26 countries, †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed); arelative to intercept only model (variance 1.07).
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to the relatively small country-level sample size and
the statistical power required to detect interaction
effects. We conclude that Hypothesis 5 is only
weakly supported.
The effects of the three institutional predictors
together with their interaction effects (Model 5)
explained 53% of the country-level variance beyond
the control variables, corresponding to 12.7% of the
total variation in SE. The interaction effects alone
explained 18% of the country-level (and 4.3% of
the total) variation in SE (Model 5) and provide
further support for the institutional conﬁguration
perspective.
DISCUSSION
This multilevel study contributes to our understand-
ing of national contexts facilitating individuals’
engagement in SE. Beyond the speciﬁc results which
enhance our understanding of SE as a domain of
inquiry, our study contributes to institutional theory
by advancing an integrative, conﬁgurational view of
formal and informal institutions; and by clarifying
the role of institutional voids vs institutional sup-
port. It also contributes to entrepreneurship research
by highlighting the importance of contexts that
enable resource access.
Contributions to Institutional Theory
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that joint institutional
conﬁgurations of formal and informal institutions
offer more explanatory power than examinations of
their individual effects. The conﬁguration perspec-
tive enables greater integration of research on formal
and informal institutions and thus transcends the
theoretical debate on whether formal or informal
institutions are more important for certain outcomes
in IB research. Theorizing and testing the effect of
conﬁgurations is an established practice in such
disciplines as strategic management and psychology
(Short, Payne, & Ketchen, 2008; Tett & Burnett,
2003), but has received little attention in institu-
tional theory (Scott, 2005), particularly in compara-
tive entrepreneurship research (Bruton et al., 2010;
Jones et al., 2011). One exception is past entrepre-
neurship research that focused on how informal
social relationships may substitute for the effects of
weak rule of law (Estrin et al., 2013b; Puffer,
McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). Our ﬁndings offer a
wider perspective, by demonstrating that informal
and formal institutions can also have additive and
mutually reinforcing effects (e.g., government acti-
vism and SSC weak-tie social capital).
Collectively our ﬁndings provide strong backing
for the institutional support perspective as opposed to
the institutional void perspective. Although very high
levels of postmaterialism may to some extent com-
pensate for low government activism, SE activity is
generally higher when government activism is high.
Thus our ﬁndings are at odds with the view that
creating greater demand for SE by reducing govern-
ment activism (through lower government spending
or less progressive taxation) stimulates greater
engagement in SE, or that government activism
would “crowd out” private pro-social initiatives such
as SE. By contrast, our ﬁndings point to the impor-
tance of complementary support from formal and
informal social capital institutions. This way our
study extends emerging research in behavioral and
public economics suggesting that greater govern-
ment activism can “crowd in” rather than “crowd
out” further private ﬁnancial support (Andreoni,
Payne, & Smith, 2014; Heutel, 2014). It also shows
that notions of synergy between government
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involvement and private cooperative efforts
(Skocpol, 2008; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) extend
to SE.
Building on Scott’s three-pillar framework, our
research emphasizes the beneﬁt of an integrated,
multidisciplinary conﬁgurational approach to theo-
rizing about institutions, which combines the
focus in cross-cultural psychology on informal insti-
tutions with the focus in institutional economics on
formal institutions. Scott’s differentiation of cogni-
tive and normative informal institutions parallels
the notions of cultural values and practices in cross-
cultural research (Javidan et al., 2006) and thus
enables the integration of this rich research tradition
into institutional theory and research. Conse-
quently, we suggest cross-cultural psychologists
should consider formal institutions when exploring
the effects of culture as well as differentiate between
cultural values and norms.We encourage researchers
in new institutional economics to consider informal
institutions when exploring the effects of formal
institutions.
Contribution to Social (and Commercial)
Entrepreneurship
This study contributes to recent calls for greater
consideration of context in examining entrepre-
neurial behavior (Zahra & Wright, 2011; Welter,
2011). Our ﬁndings suggest that national context
drives individual engagement in SE mainly through
resource-based mechanisms and supply side motiva-
tional inﬂuences and less through incentives arising
from demands (such as institutional voids). Speciﬁ-
cally, they highlight the importance of national
contexts that enable organizations to access tangible
and intangible resources through formal and infor-
mal channels. Similar results with regard to the
importance of informal cultural support were identi-
ﬁed in past research on CE (Autio et al., 2013;
Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). Consequently, we sug-
gest that future research in comparative (social)
entrepreneurship may fruitfully build closer links
between institutional theory and the resource-based
view (Barney, Ketchen, & Wright, 2011), and give
resource considerations a more central role in theo-
rizing alongside motivational mechanisms. To date,
resources are only discussed as a side-issue in supply–
demand models in CE research, variously seen as
one capability of individuals on the supply side
(Wennekers, Uhlaner, & Thurik, 2002) or implicitly
treated as aspects of demand (Thornton, 1999).
Our ﬁndings also underscore the need to investi-
gate contextual drivers speciﬁc to distinct types of
entrepreneurship (Zahra & Wright, 2011) including
theoretical models speciﬁc to SE. Comparisons of our
ﬁndings with past research on CE highlight opposite
effects of government activism and postmaterialism
on CE and SE (Aidis et al., 2012; Uhlaner & Thurik,
2007). It could be that by controlling for other types
of entrepreneurship by motive, some of the past
contradictory results in research on cultural values
can be sorted out: for instance, individualismmay be
primarily linked to independence-motivated entre-
preneurship, whereas collectivism may be linked to
the prevalence of family-owned ﬁrms.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This study followed state-of-the-art practices in test-
ing multilevel hypotheses on a sample of over
106,000 individuals across 26 diverse countries from
four continents and at various phases of develop-
ment. Data for the independent and dependent
variables were collected from different sources, thus
eliminating concerns about common method bias.
In addition, data on all independent variables were
collected before the data on the dependent variable
(SE), enhancing our conﬁdence in the causal direc-
tion of these ﬁndings. Nevertheless, some limita-
tions were beyond our control.
First, our analyses should be repeated on a larger
sample of countries, as factor-driven economies were
under-represented and innovation-driven econo-
mies somewhat over-represented in our data set.
Notably, signiﬁcant effects, especially when testing
interactions, are harder to establish with smaller
sample sizes, which limit statistical power. Similarly,
the low incidence rate of SE (Table 1) limited statis-
tical power. However, the high ICC(1) statistic
for SE indicated that a large proportion of the total
variance in SE resided at the country level, which
partially mitigated these statistical power concerns.
The fact that we found support for our hypotheses,
including a robust interaction effect of postmaterial-
ism and government activism, even within a rela-
tively small sample of countries, supports the
validity of our ﬁndings. The results from the various
supplementary analyses (e.g., entering predictors
separately, adding GDP growth and rule of law as
control variables, and using revenue-generating SE
as an alternative dependent variable) also support
the robustness of the ﬁndings.
Second, we used one indicator of overall SE
activity. Future research may investigate SE as a
process across countries (Bergmann & Stephan,
2013), addressing questions about the emergence
and sustainability of SE in more detail. For instance,
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comparing our ﬁndings to Estrin et al. (2013a)
suggests differences in institutional drivers of early
stage SE start-up efforts. Although we identiﬁed
revenue-generating SE as one quality indicator,
future research could differentiate SE by the scale of
its social impact, for example, addressing local needs
vs creating large-scale social change (Zahra et al.,
2009).
A third limitation is how SE was measured in the
GEM study. The initial screening question included
examples of social or community objectives while
omitting examples of environmental objectives
(Appendix A), which may lead to an under-represen-
tation of environmental SE.
A fourth limitation is the general way in which
government activism was measured. Cross-country
data do not allow us to determine the type of
spending that might be most effective, that is, direct
subsidies for entrepreneurs, ﬁnancial support for the
unemployed, or skills training for potential or exist-
ing (social) entrepreneurs.
Fifth, one of our measures of institutions, SSC, is
based on the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004).
GLOBE data were collected between 1995 and 1997,
about 13 years before the data for SE. Also, some
criticize the way in which GLOBE measured cultural
values (Brewer & Venaik, 2010; Maseland & van
Hoorn, 2010). However, since the SSC index builds
on practice scores, most such critiques do not apply
to our study.
Finally, as with many IB studies, endogeneity is a
concern, particularly since past research emphasizes
the link between postmaterialism and economic
growth. However, recent research suggests that eco-
nomic development plays a less important role in
the development of postmaterialism in contrast to
cultural socialization (Kroh, 2009). We also adopted
common precautions to deal with endogeneity con-
cerns such as using time lags between the indepen-
dent and dependent variables and controlling for
potential alternative causes at the country and indi-
vidual levels.
We chose predictors guided by the three-pillar
framework presented by Scott (1995) and by theoriz-
ing on SE. Future research may nevertheless wish to
investigate other cultural values and norms such as
those included in CE research (Hayton, George, &
Zahra, 2002). Since SE entails dealing with uncer-
tainty, cultural uncertainty–avoidance may be rele-
vant, potentially in conﬁguration with formal
institutions (such as rule of law). In-group collecti-
vism may also play a role through enabling resource
support within families. Future research could also
explore cross-level interaction effects, for example,
testing how institutions including culture moderate
the impact of individual-level variables on SE.
Practical Implications
Our ﬁndings can ultimately inform policymakers
wishing to enhance SE. One of the most important
implications relates to the institutional void perspec-
tive. Our study provides clear counterevidence for
policies designed to stimulate SE by cutting services
or reducing other types of government support. Our
data suggest that radical cuts in the state sector (such
as those seen in many countries in response to the
global economic crisis that started in 2007) are
unlikely to motivate more individuals to engage in
SE. Our results clearly suggest that more (not less)
active governments (i.e., those that have relatively
high levels of progressive taxation and government
spending) help foster the creation of operating social
enterprises, in line with the institutional support
perspective. Thus governments should not be timid
in supporting SE for fear that this will reduce pri-
vately led initiatives.
Our ﬁndings on institutional conﬁgurations sug-
gest that policymakers need to take formal and
informal institutions into account when pondering
policy decisions. This includes both cultural values
that are prevalent in their country and the informal
norms regarding social support.
CONCLUSION
The institutional conﬁguration perspective recog-
nizes that human behavior is jointly shaped by
formal and informal institutions, a proposition often
discussed but rarely empirically tested. Collectively
our ﬁndings support the notion that one important
route to advancing IB and comparative entrepre-
neurship research is to integrate the largely separate
research streams on informal institutions/culture
and formal institutions by considering conﬁgura-
tions of both types of institutions.
Furthermore, our research is one of the ﬁrst multi-
level studies to examine the contextual drivers of SE
and to provide an empirical test comparing the
institutional void perspective to the institutional
support perspective. We ﬁnd strong support for the
institutional support perspective, consistent with
the notion that access to tangible and intangible
resources from both government and private indivi-
duals is a key enabler of entrepreneurial activity. This
calls for future research to integrate resource-based
approaches more closely into theorizing about how
Institutions and social entrepreneurship Ute Stephan et al
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national context and institutions impact entrepre-
neurial activity.
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NOTES
1The Big Society initiative seeks to empower local
communities and voluntary and community organi-
zations. It includes the setting up of a dedicated
financing institution and regulatory changes.
2To measure government activism, an indicator that
directly measures welfare spending may be preferable.
However, harmonized cross-country data for welfare
spending were either not available for all countries or
were not sufficiently recent. Correlations between
our government activism indicator and other specific
indicators supported its validity as reflecting govern-
ments’ social vs military engagement. In a 20-country
subsample, government activism showed a strong
positive correlation with the percentage of GDP spent
on total public social protection and health care in
2006 (OECD, 2011) (r=0.88, p<0.001), but only a
trivial correlation with military spending (SIPRI, 2013)
(r=0.07, n.s., N=26). In separate analyses available
from the authors, we substituted government activism
with military spending and, as expected, found non-
significant effects on SE. This further supports our view
that government activism reflects social rather than
military spending.
3Some researchers use a 12-item version of the post-
materialism index, also termed survival/self-expression
index. We prefer the 4-item index because, unlike the
12-item index, it does not mix value items with other
items tapping into trust, behavioral description, and self-
description items of happiness (Bond et al., 2004). The
correlation between the 4- and 12-item versions was high
(0.86 across the 26 countries in our data set).
4Stephan and Uhlaner (2010) report details of the
secondary factor analysis used to derive the SSC index,
which was successfully replicated by Autio et al. (2013)
across 40 countries, and by us for our 26-country
sample. We used z-standardized scores of humane
orientation and assertiveness (reverse scored) before
taking their average.
5We conducted a range of further robustness checks
including removing GDP (exploring endogeneity
concerns) and separately removing Denmark as it has
the highest SE rate in the sample. Their results support
the pattern of findings reported in the results section
and are available from the authors upon request.
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Appendix A
Questions for SE from the GEM (2009)
Appendix B
Questions Used to Measure Postmaterialism
and SSC
Postmaterialism cultural values
These items were measured as part of the WVS
(2010). In this index, respondents are asked to select
the most important and second-most important
goals a country should have from the following four
items: (a) maintaining order in the nation, (b) giving
people more to say in important government deci-
sions, (c) ﬁghting rising prices, and (d) protecting
freedom of speech. The postmaterialism index is
based on the percentage of the population indicat-
ing items (b) and (d) as their ﬁrst and second choices,
irrespective of the order. In the WVS data set these
individuals are coded “3” – Postmaterialist.
SSC norms
These items are part of the humane orientation and
assertiveness cultural-practice scales taken from the
GLOBE project (House et al., 2004) and validated as
the SSC construct by Stephan and Uhlaner (2010).
Items were answered on a 7-point scale. R indicates
1
“Don’t know” and “refused” were treated as missing values. 
Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start or currently owning and managing any kind of
activity, organization or initiative that has a particularly social, environmental or community objective?
This might include providing services or training to socially deprived or disabled persons, using profits
for socially oriented purposes, organizing self-help groups for community action, etc.   
Yes, currently trying to start
Yes, currently owning-managing,
Yes, currently trying to start & owning managing 
Not further considered:
No, Don’t know, Refused1 
Over the past 12 months have you done anything to
help start this activity, organization or initiative,
such as looking for equipment or a location,
organizing a start-up team, working on a business
plan, beginning to save money, or any other
activity that would help launch an organization?     
Yes Not further considered:No, Don’t know, Refused
Will you personally manage, all, part or none
of this intended activity, organization or
initiative?  
All, Part Not further considered:
None, Don’t know, Refused
Has the activity, organization or initiative
provided services to others, or received
external funding for more than three months?   
No Not further considered:Don’t know, Refused
Yes
What was the first year the activity,
organization or initiative provided services
to others, or received external funding?  
Nascent social entrepreneurs
Not yet
Operating social entrepreneurs 
< 2010
Does any of the revenue for this activity,
organization or initiative come from income,
for example, through sales of products or
charging for services?   
Operating, revenue-generating social
entrepreneurs  
Yes
Do you personally manage, all, part or none
of this activity, organization or initiative? 
All, Part Not further considered:
None, Don’t know, Refused
Yes, currently owning-managing
Yes, currently trying to start &
owning managing  
Not further considered:
Don’t know, Refused
Will any of the revenue for this activity,
organization or initiative come from income,
for example, through sales of products or
charging for services?   
Nascent, revenue-generating social
entrepreneurs 
Yes
Social entrepreneurs
Revenue-generating social entrepreneurs
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items that were recoded in correspondence with
coding for the SSC scale (Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010).
Humane orientation cultural practices scales
In this society, people are generally…
1 very concerned about others – 7 not at all
concerned about others (R)
1 very sensitive toward others – 7 not at all
sensitive toward others (R)
1 very friendly – 7 very unfriendly (R)
1 very tolerant of mistakes – 7 not at all tolerant of
mistakes (R)
1 very generous – 7 not generous at all (R)
Assertiveness cultural practice scales
In this society, people are generally…
1 aggressive – 7 non-aggressive
1 assertive – 7 non-assertive
1 dominant – 7 non-dominant
1 tough – 7 tender
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